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Mostrando postagens com marcador europa. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador europa. Mostrar todas as postagens

17 janeiro 2022

Clubes de Futebol da Europa e desempenho financeiro


Segundo uma reportagem do Accountancy Daily o desempenho financeiro dos clubes de futebol da Europa na temporada encerrada em maio de 2021 teve influencia da pandemia. Eis alguns destaques:

* A estrutura de custos rígida - elevados custos fixos - fez com que a maioria dos clubes tivesse prejuízo. Os maiores prejuízos em termos absolutos foram da Inter de Milão (245 milhões de euros) e Atlético de Madrid (112 milhões). O resultado da Inter é recorde entre os clubes italianos. 

* Parte do prejuízo é explicado pela queda da receita. O Manchester City é uma exceção, pois teve um crescimento da receita para 644 milhões de euros e pela primeira vez este número é maior que seu rival, o Manchester United (557 milhões). Parte do aumento é resultado do prêmio por chegar na final da Champions: 96 milhões

* O Bayern é o único clube, da análise realizada, que teve lucro, embora menor. O desempenho do Bayern merece destaque pois o clube manteve um valor baixo dos custos com pessoal em relação ao total da receita: 58%. Além disto, pela 29a vez o Bayern obteve lucro. 

Foto: Unuabona

16 junho 2021

Europa amplia o número de empresas que devem evidenciar a sustentabilidade


Passou um pouco desapercebido, mas a Europa está ampliando o número de empresas que serão obrigadas a apresentar os relatórios de sustentabilidade corporativa, conhecido como CSRD. A estimativa é que este número aumente de 11.600 para 49 mil. Isto inclui empresas na bolsa e grandes empresas não listadas. 

A definição de "grande" empresa seria aquela com ativo acima de 20 milhões de euros, receita acima de 40 milhões de euros e número de empregados acima de 250

A evidenciação abrange as metas de sustentabilidade e o progresso feito para alcançá-las, a função dos órgãos de administração, gestão e governança em relação aos fatores de sustentabilidade, os impactos negativos mais significativos da empresa, entre outras informações. 

15 fevereiro 2021

Apple e a questão dos impostos na Europa

Acompanhamos no passado o caso da possibilidade da Apple pagar imposto de renda na Europa. A empresa usava um planejamento tributário bem agressivo, usando a Irlanda. Isto foi destaque há anos. Depois, parecia que a Apple tinha vencido o confronto, com o reconhecimento da Europa, que a empresa tinha usado as normas a seu favor. Agora, a notícia de que a Comunidade Europeia está voltando atrás e pedindo o pagamento dos impostos. Eis a notícia da Forbes (imagem aqui)

UE alega erro judicial e pede pagamento de US$ 15,7 bi em impostos pela Apple

As autoridades antitruste da União Europeia alegaram que um tribunal cometeu erros ao suspender uma ordem para que a Apple pagasse € 13 bilhões (US$ 15,7 bilhões) em impostos atrasados na Irlanda e pediram anulação da decisão.

A Comissão está apelando para o Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia, com sede em Luxemburgo, após uma decisão do ano passado do Tribunal Geral, que disse que o executivo da UE não havia cumprido os requisitos legais para mostrar que a Apple desfrutou de uma vantagem injusta.

Em 2016, a Comissão disse que duas decisões fiscais irlandesas reduziram artificialmente a carga tributária que incide sobre a Apple por mais de duas décadas, que em 2014 era de apenas 0,005%.

“O fato de o Tribunal Geral não ter devidamente considerado a estrutura e o conteúdo da decisão e as explicações nas observações escritas da Comissão sobre as funções desempenhadas pelas sedes e pelas subsidiárias irlandesas da Apple é uma violação do procedimento”, afirmou a Comissão em documento.


A Apple disse que o julgamento do Tribunal Geral provou que sempre cumpriu as leis irlandesas, com o problema sendo mais sobre onde a companhia deveria pagar impostos do que sobre o valor de tais taxas. (Com Reuters)

26 novembro 2019

Formato Eletrônico das IFRS na Europa

A Europa está adotando o formato eletrônico das demonstrações contábeis, tendo por base as IFRS, a parte de 2020. Em 2014, o Iasb constituiu um grupo de trabalho para elaborar um guia com esta finalidade. Há alguns meses, a European Securities and Markets Authorities aprovou o European Single Eletronic Format. Por enquanto, as mudanças não alcançam as notas explicativas; somente em 2022 é que terá esta abrangência.

A finalidade é a comparabilidade das informações e facilitar o acesso às demonstrações.

Leia mais aqui

23 novembro 2018

Concentração no mercado de auditoria

Os gráficos mostram a participação das grandes empresas de auditoria nos principais mercados de valores da Europa.Em quase todos eles a participação é acima de 70%. E este percentual tem se alterado muito pouco nos últimos anos. Veja o caso do mercado escandinavo, onde mais de 80% das empresas são auditadas pelas Big Four.
A França parece ser uma exceção, já que a participação das Big Four é de 50% e parece estar diminuindo. Pelo menos duas outras grandes empresas são atuantes neste mercado: Mazar e Grant. Isto pode ser em razão de uma questão cultural, mas as regras de atuação no setor também ajudam.
A seguir o mercado italiano, alemão e londrino.



03 julho 2017

Bancos europeus com problemas

Os bancos tendem a falir quando ao índice Texas, uma medida de maus empréstimos em relação a reserva e capital ultrapassar 100%, o que significa que eles não têm capital suficiente para cobrir todos os problemas. Como informamos há alguns meses, 114 dos 500 bancos na Itália possuem um índice Texas de mais de 100%. Daqueles, 24 possuem índices de mais de 200%. Desde então, um deles (Monte dei Pacshi) foi resgatado com fundos públicos, enquanto outros dois (Veneto Banca e Banca Popolare di Vicenza) foram liquidados com fundos públicos. Três a menos ou 111 (ou 21) da lista.

Fonte: Aqui

29 junho 2017

Popular e a rede de proteção de bancos na Europa

Os detalhes da quebra do Banco Popular parece indicar que o sistema bancário da Europa não possui uma rede de proteção eficaz. Pelo menos é o que permite concluir a partir da informação do site Wolfstreet.

As informações recentes mostram que o Banco Popular estava perdendo cerca de 2 bilhões de euros de depósitos por dia. E eram os investidores institucionais os principais responsáveis, como um fundo de segurança social espanhol, agências governamentais e outras entidades do setor público. Ou seja, o próprio governo contribuiu fortemente para a quebra do banco. E levanta uma suspeita de que o governo usou informação privilegiada para salvar seus recursos, acelerando o processo de quebra, enquanto o pequeno correntista perdeu. Ao mesmo tempo que os investidores institucionais faziam suas retiradas, o Ministro da Economia afirmava que não existia motivo de preocupação.

Mesmo depois que o Santander entrou no negócio, comprando o Popular por 1 euro, mas prometendo colocar algo em torno de 7 bilhões de euros na instituição, o volume de depósitos continuou a reduzir. Os recursos para cobrir os depósitos, na Espanha, estão limitados a 100 mil euros por pessoa. Mas o Fundo de Garantia de Depósitos da Espanha não tinha recursos para cobrir os prejuízos. Este é o ponto crucial que leva a suspeitar da proteção do sistema bancário espanhol: o FSB, um conselho de estabilidade financeira da Europa, não considerava que o Banco Popular seria “grande demais para quebrar”. Na realidade, somente o Santander estaria enquadrado nesta categoria. O Popular seria o sexto banco espanhol em porte e não seria socorrido. Tudo leva a crer que a opção de deixar falir poderia gerar um efeito sobre as demais instituições financeiras espanholas.

30 janeiro 2014

Auditoria na Europa

Está previsto para abril a votação pelo Parlamento Europeu (foto) da reforma no mercado de auditoria. Esta semana a Comissão de Assuntos Jurídicos aprovou a exigência de rodízio das auditorias a cada dez anos. Isto inclui as empresas de capital aberto. A proposta prevê algumas exceções.

25 janeiro 2014

Fato da Semana

Fato da Semana: A Europa decidiu fazer uma reflexão sobre a adoção das normas internacionais de contabilidade

Qual a relevância disto? A Europa foi pioneira na adoção das normas internacionais de contabilidade. Somente após sua adoção pelos países europeus é que outras nações resolveram usar estas normas, como foi o caso do Brasil. Apesar das normas, as IFRS, ainda não serem adotadas plenamente por países como Estados Unidos, Japão e Índia, desde a decisão da Europa passamos a contar com duas estruturas conceituais relevantes: a do Iasb e a estadunidense (ou Fasb).

Já se passaram quase dez anos desde a decisão da Europa. Esta semana anunciou-se que a associação de contadores da Inglaterra e do País de Gales, a ICAEW, juntamente com uma empresa francesa de auditoria, irá fazer uma análise da decisão europeia.

Positivo ou negativo? Positivo, sem dúvida. Mesmo que o relatório seja desanimador com respeito aos benefícios, é fundamental conhecer se os benefícios das normas internacionais foram superiores aos custos. Afinal, qual a razão de ter medo de fazer uma reflexão sobre esta escolha? E por que esta atitude não é adotada, de maneira clara e transparente, em outros países?

Desdobramentos – O relatório deverá ficar pronto em 2014 ainda e os desdobramentos estarão associados às conclusões. Mas é preciso ficar atento ao uso do relatório como instrumento de pressão para modificar a estrutura conceitual, como deseja a Europa.

29 julho 2013

George Papandreou: Imagine uma democracia europeia sem fronteiras

A Grécia foi a representante da crise econômica europeia, mas o ex-primeiro-ministro George Papandreou questiona se isso é apenas uma prévia do que está por vir. "Nossas democracias", diz ele, "estão presas por sistemas que são grandes demais para falir, ou mais precisamente, grandes demais para controlar" -- enquanto que "políticos como eu perderam a confiança de seus povos." Como resolver isso? Fazendo com que cidadãos se comprometam mais diretamente em um novo contrato democrático.

30 maio 2013

Entrevista com Barry Eichengreen

Excelente entrevista retirada do site do Fed de Cleveland com o professor Barry Eichengreen.

To some, the term “economic historian” conjures up images of an academic whose only interests lie deep in the past; an armchair scholar who holds forth on days long ago but has no insights about the present. Barry Eichengreen provides a useful corrective to that stereotype. For, as much as Eichengreen has studied episodes in economic history, he seems more attuned to connecting the past to the present. At the same time, he is mindful that “lessons” have a way of taking on lives of their own. What’s taken as given among economic historians today may be wholly rejected in the future.
Barry Eichengreen is the George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, his hometown. He is known as an expert on monetary systems and global finance. He has authored more than a dozen books and many more academic papers on topics from the Great Depression to the recent financial crisis.
Eichengreen was a keynote speaker at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s research conference, Current Policy under the Lens of Economic History, in December 2012. Mark Sniderman, the Cleveland Fed’s executive vice president and chief policy officer, interviewed Eichengreen during his visit. An edited transcript follows.
Sniderman: It’s an honor to talk with you. You’re here at this conference to discuss the uses and misuses of economic history. Can you give us an example of how people inaccurately apply lessons from the past to the recent financial crisis?
Eichengreen: The honor is mine.
Whenever I say “lessons,” please understand the word to be surrounded by quotation marks. My point is that “lessons” when drawn mechanically have considerable capacity to mislead. For example, one “lesson” from the literature on the Great Depression was how disruptive serious banking crises can be. That, in a nutshell, is why the Fed and its fellow regulators paid such close attention to the banking system in the run-up to the recent crisis. But that “lesson” of history was, in part, what allowed them to overlook what was happening in the shadow banking system, as our system of lightly regulated near-banks is known.
What did they miss it? One answer is that there was effectively no shadow banking system to speak of in the 1930s. We learned to pay close attention to what was going on in the banking system, narrowly defined. That bias may have been part of what led policymakers to miss what was going on in other parts of the financial system.
Another example, this one from Europe, is the “lesson” that there is necessarily such a thing as expansionary fiscal consolidation. Europeans, when arguing that such a thing exists, look to the experience of the Netherlands and Ireland in the 1980s, when those countries cut their budget deficits without experiencing extended recessions. Both countries were able to consolidate but continue to grow, leading contemporary observers to argue that the same should be true in Europe today. But reasoning from that historical case to today misleads because the circumstances at both the country and global level were very different. Ireland and the Netherlands were small. They were consolidating in a period when the world economy was growing. These facts allowed them to substitute external demand for domestic demand. In addition, unlike European countries today they had their own monetary policies, allowing them step down the exchange rate, enhancing the competitiveness of their exports at one fell swoop, and avoid extended recessions. But it does not follow from their experience that the same is necessarily possible today. Everyone in Europe is consolidating simultaneously. Most nations lack their own independent exchange rate and monetary policies. And the world economy is not growing robustly.


A third “lesson” of history capable equally of informing and misinforming policy would be the belief in Germany that hyperinflation is always and everywhere just around the corner. Whenever the European Central Bank does something unconventional, like its program of Outright Monetary Transactions, there are warnings in German press that this is about to unleash the hounds of inflation. This presumption reflects from the “lesson” of history, taught in German schools, that there is no such thing as a little inflation. It reflects the searing impact of the hyperinflation of the 1920s, in other words. From a distance, it’s interesting and more than a little peculiar that those textbooks fail to mention the high unemployment rate in the 1930s and how that also had highly damaging political and social consequences.
The larger question is whether it is productive to think in terms of “history lessons.” Economic theory has no lessons; instead, it simply offers a way of systematically structuring how we think about the world. The same is true of history.
Sniderman: Let’s pick up on a couple of your comments about the Great Depression and hyperinflation in Germany. Today, some people in the United States have the same concerns. They look at the expansion of the monetary base and worry about inflation. Do you find it surprising that people are still fighting about whether big inflation is just around the corner because of US monetary policy, and is it appropriate to think about that in the context of the unemployment situation as well?
Eichengreen: I don’t find it surprising that the conduct of monetary policy is contested. Debate and disagreement are healthy. Fiat money is a complicated concept; not everyone trusts it. But while it’s important to think about inflation risks, it’s also important to worry about the permanent damage to potential output that might result from an extended period subpar growth. To be sure, reasonable people can question whether the Fed possesses tools suitable for addressing this problem. But it’s important to have that conversation.
Sniderman: Maybe just one more question in this direction because so much of your research has centered on the Great Depression. Surely you’ve been thinking about some of the similarities and differences between that period and this one. Have you come to any conclusions about that? Where are the congruencies and incongruences?
Eichengreen: My work on the Depression highlighted its international dimension. It emphasized the role of the gold standard and other international linkages in the onset of the Depression, and it emphasized the role that abandoning the gold standard and changing the international monetary regime played in bringing it to an end.
As a student, I was struck by the tendency in much of the literature on the Depression to treat the US essentially as a closed economy. Not surprisingly, perhaps, I was then struck by the tendency in 2007 to think about what was happening then as a US subprime crisis. Eventually, we came to realize that we were facing not just a US crisis but a global crisis. But there was an extended period during when many observers, in Europe in particular, thought that their economies were immune. They viewed what was happening as an exclusively American problem. They didn’t realize that what happened in the United States doesn’t stay in the United States. They didn’t realize that European banks, which rely heavily on dollar funding, were tightly linked to US economic and financial conditions. One of the first bits of research I did when comparing the Great Depression with the global credit crisis, together with Kevin O’Rourke, was to construct indicators of GDP, industrial production, trade, and stock market valuations worldwide and to show that, when viewed globally, the current crisis was every bit as severe as that of the 1930s.
Eventually, we came to realize that we were facing not just a US crisis but a global crisis. But there was an extended period during when many observers, in Europe in particular, thought that their economies were immune.
Sniderman: Given that many European countries are sharing our financial distress, what changes in the international monetary regime, if any, would be helpful? Could that avenue for thinking of solutions be as important this time around as it was the last time?
Eichengreen: One of the few constants in the historical record is dissatisfaction with the status quo. When exchange rates were fixed, Milton Friedman wrote that flexible rates would be better. When rates became flexible, others like Ron McKinnon argued that it would be better if we returned to pegs. The truth is that there are tradeoffs between fixed and flexible rates and, more generally, in the design of any international monetary system. Exchange rate commitments limit the autonomy of national monetary policymakers, which can be a good thing if that autonomy is being misused. But it can be a bad thing if that autonomy is needed to address pressing economic problems. The reality is that there is no such thing as the perfect exchange rate regime. Or, as Jeffrey Frankel put it, no one exchange rate regime is suitable for all times and places.
That said, there has tended to be movement over time in the direction of greater flexibility and greater discretion for policymakers. This reflects the fact that the mandate for central banks has grown more complex – necessarily, I would argue, given the growing complexity of the economy. An implication of that more complex mandate is the need for more discretion and judgment in the conduct of monetary policy—and a more flexible exchange rate to allow that discretion to be exercised.
Sniderman: I’d be interested in knowing whether you thought this crisis would have played out differently in the European Union if the individual countries still had their own currencies. Has the euro, per se, been an element in the problems that Europe is having, much as a regime fixed to gold was a problem during the Great Depression?
Eichengreen: Europe is a special case, as your question acknowledges. Europeans have their own distinctive history and they have drawn their own distinctive “lessons” from it. They looked at the experience of the 1930s and concluded that what we would now call currency warfare, that is, beggar-thy-neighbor exchange-rate policies, were part of what created tensions leading to World War II. The desire to make Europe a more peaceful place led to the creation of the European Union. And integral to that initiative was the effort was to stabilize exchange rates, first on an ad hoc basis and then by moving to the euro.
Whether things will play out as anticipated is, as always, an open question. We now know that the move to monetary union was premature. Monetary union requires at least limited banking union. Banking union requires at least limited fiscal union. And fiscal union requires at least limited political union. The members of the euro zone are now moving as fast as they can, which admittedly is not all that fast, to retrofit their monetary union to include a banking union, a fiscal union, and some form of political union. Time will tell whether or not they succeed.
But even if hindsight tells us that moving to a monetary union in 1999 was premature, it is important to understand that history doesn’t always run in reverse. The Europeans now will have to make their monetary union work. If they don’t, they’ll pay a high price.
I didn’t anticipate the severity and intractability of the euro crisis. All I can say in my defense is that no one did.
Sniderman: Let me pose a very speculative question. Would you say that if the Europeans had understood from the beginning what might be required to make all this work, they might not have embarked on the experiment; but because they did it as they did, there’s a greater likelihood that they’ll do what’s necessary to make the euro system endure? Is that how you’re conjecturing things will play out?
Eichengreen: If I may, allow me to refer back to the early literature on the euro. In 1992, in adopting theMaastricht Treaty, the members of the European Union committed to forming a monetary union. That elicited a flurry of scholarship. An article I wrote about that time with Tamim Bayoumi looked at whether a large euro area or a small euro area was better. We concluded that a small euro area centered on France, Germany, and the Benelux countries made more sense. So one mistake the Europeans made, which was predictable perhaps on political grounds, though no more excusable, was to opt for a large euro area.
I had another article in the Journal of Economic Literature in which I devoted several pages to the need for a banking union; on the importance, if you’re going to have a single currency, single financial market and integrated banking system, of also having common bank supervision, regulation, and resolution. European leaders, in their wisdom, thought that they could force the pace. They thought that by moving to monetary union they could force their members to agree to banking union more quickly. More quickly didn’t necessarily mean overnight; they thought that they would have a couple of decades to complete the process. Unfortunately, they were side-swiped by the 2007-08 crisis. What they thought would be a few decades turned out to be one, and they’ve now grappling with the consequences.
Sniderman: You’ve written about the dollar’s role as a global currency and a reserve currency, and you have some thoughts on where that’s all headed. Maybe you could elaborate on that.
Eichengreen: A first point, frequently overlooked, is that there has regularly been more than one consequential international currency. In the late nineteenth century, there was not only the pound sterling but also the French franc and the German mark. In the 1920s there was both the dollar and the pound sterling. The second half of the twentieth century is the historical anomaly, the one period when was only one global currency because there was only one large country with liquid financial markets open to the rest of the world—the United States. The dollar dominated in this period simply because there were no alternatives.
But this cannot remain the case forever. The US will not be able to provide safe and liquid assets in the quantity required by the rest of the world for an indefinite period. Emerging markets will continue to emerge. Other countries will continue to catch up to the technological leader, which is still, happily, the United States. The US currently accounts for about 25 percent of the global economy. Ten years from now, that fraction might be 20 percent, and 20 years from now it is apt to be less. The US Treasury’s ability to stand behind a stock of Treasury bonds, which currently constitute the single largest share of foreign central banks’ reserves and international liquidity generally, will grow more limited relative to the scale of the world economy. There will have to be alternatives.
In the book I wrote on this subject a couple of years ago, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System, I pointed to the euro and the Chinese renminbi as the plausible alternatives. I argued that both could conceivably be significant rivals to the dollar by 2020. The dollar might well remain number one as invoicing currency and currency for trade settlements, and as a vehicle for private investment in central bank reserves, but the euro and renminbi could be nipping at its heels.
In the fullness of time I’ve grown more pessimistic about the prospects of those rivals. Back in 2010, when my book went off to the publisher, I didn’t anticipate the severity and intractability of the euro crisis. All I can say in my defense is that no one did. And I underestimated how much work the Chinese will have to do in order to successfully internationalize their currency. They are still moving in that direction; they’ve taken steps to encourage firms to use the renminbi for trade invoicing and settlements, and now they are liberalizing access to their financial markets, if gradually. But they have a deeper problem. Every reserve currency in history has been the currency of a political democracy or a republic of one sort or another. Admittedly the US and Britain are only two observations, which doesn’t exactly leave many degrees of freedom for testing this hypothesis. But if you go back before the dollar and sterling, the leading international currencies were those of Dutch Republic, the Republic of Venice, and the Republic of Genoa. These cases are similarly consistent with the hypothesis.
The question is why. The answer is that international investors, including central banks, are willing to hold the assets only of governments that are subject to checks and balances that limit the likelihood of their acting opportunistically. Political democracy and republican forms of governance are two obvious sources of such checks and balances. In other words, China will have to demonstrate that its central government is subject to limits on arbitrary action – that political decentralization, the greater power of nongovernmental organizations, or some other mechanism – that place limits on arbitrary action before foreign investors, both official and private, are fully comfortable about holding its currency.
I therefore worry not so much about these rivals dethroning the dollar as I do about the US losing the capacity to provide safe, liquid assets on the requisite scale before adequate alternatives emerge. Switzerland is not big enough to provide safe and liquid assets on the requisite scale; neither is Norway, nor Canada, nor Australia. Currently we may be swimming in a world awash with liquidity, but we shouldn’t lose sight of the danger that, say, 10 years from now there won’t be enough international liquidity to grease the wheels of twenty-first-century globalization.
Sniderman: It sounds to me as though you’re also trying to say that the United States should actually become comfortable with, perhaps even welcome, this development, because its absence creates some risks for us.
Eichengreen: I am. The United States benefits from the existence of a robust, integrated global economy. But globalization, in turn, requires liquidity. And the US, by itself, can’t all by itself satisfy the global economy’s international liquidity needs. So the shift toward a multipolar global monetary and financial system is something that we should welcome. It will be good for us, and it will be good for the global economy. To the extent that we have to pay a couple more basis points when we sell Treasury debt because we don’t have a captive market in the form of foreign central banks, that’s not a prohibitive cost.
Sniderman: And how has the financial crisis itself affected the timetable and the movement? It sounds like in some sense it’s retarding it.
Eichengreen: The crisis is clearly slowing the shift away from dollar dominance. When the subprime crisis broke, a lot of people thought the dollar would fall dramatically and that the People’s Bank of China might liquidate its dollar security holdings. What we discovered is that, in a crisis, there’s nothing that individuals, governments and central banks value more than liquidity. And the single most liquid market in the world is the market for US Treasury bonds. When Lehman Bros. failed, as a result of U.S. policy, everybody rushed toward the dollar rather than away. When Congress had its peculiar debate in August 2011 over raising the debt ceiling, everybody rushed toward the dollar rather than away. That fact may be ironic, but it’s true.
And a second effect of the crisis was to retard the emergence of the euro on the global stage. That too supports the continuing dominance of the dollar.
Sniderman: Economists and policymakers have always “missed” things. Are there ways in which economic historians can help current policymakers not to be satisfied with the “lessons” of history and get them to think more generally about these issues?
Eichengreen: It’s important to make the distinction between two questions – between “Could we have done better at anticipating the crisis?” and the question “Could we have done better at responding to it?” On the first question, I would insist that it’s too much to expect economists or economic historians to accurately forecast complex contingent events like financial crises. In the 1990s, I did some work on currency crises, instances when exchange rates collapse, with Charles Wyplosz and Andrew Rose. We found that what works on historical data, in other words what works in sample doesn’t also work out of sample. We were out-of-consensus skeptics about the usefulness of leading indicators of currency crises, and I think subsequent experience has borne out our view. Paul Samuelson made the comment that economists have predicted 13 out of the last seven crises. In other words, there’s type 1 error as well as type 2 error [the problem of false positives as well as false negatives].
Coming to the recent crisis, it’s apparent with hindsight that many economists – and here I by no means exonerate economic historians – were too quick to buy into the idea that there was such a thing as the Great Moderation. That was the idea that through better regulation, improved monetary policy and the development of automatic fiscal stabilizers we had learned to limit the volatility of the business cycle. If we’d paid more attention to history, we would have recalled an earlier period when people made the same argument: They attributed the financial crises of the 19th century to the volatility of credit markets; they believed that the founding of the Fed had eliminated that problem and that the business cycle had been tamed. They concluded that the higher level of asset prices observed in the late 1920s was fully justified by the advent of a more stable economy. They may have called it the New Age rather than the Great Moderation, but the underlying idea, not to say the underlying fallacy, was the same.
A further observation relevant to understanding the role of the discipline in the recent crisis is that we haven’t done a great job as a profession of integrating macroeconomics and finance. There have been heroic efforts to do so over the years, starting with the pioneering work of Franco Modigliani and James Tobin. But neither scholarly work nor the models used by the Federal Reserve System adequately capture, even today, how financial developments and the real economy interact. When things started to go wrong financially in 2007-08, the consequences were not fully anticipated by policymakers and those who advised them – to put an understated gloss on the point. I can think of at least two prominent policy makers, who I will resist the temptation to name, who famously asserted in 2007 that the impact of declining home prices would be “contained.” It turned out that we didn’t understand how declining housing prices were linked to the financial system through collateralized debt obligations and other financial derivatives, or how those instruments were, in turn, linked to important financial institutions. So much for containment.
Sniderman: I suppose one of the challenges that the use of economic history presents is the selectivity of adoption. And here I have in mind things like going back to the Great Depression to learn “lessons.” It’s often been said, based on some of the scholarship of the Great Depression and the role of the Fed, that the “lesson” the Fed should learn is to act aggressively, to act early, and not to withdraw accommodation prematurely. And that is the framework the Fed has chosen to adopt. At the same time, others draw “lessons” from other parts of US economic history and say, “You can’t imagine that this amount of liquidity creation, balance sheet expansion, etc. would not lead to a great inflation.” If people of different viewpoints choose places in history where they say, “History teaches us X,” and use them to buttress their view of the appropriate response, I suppose there’s no way around that other than to trying, as you said earlier, to point out whether these comparisons are truly apt or not.
Eichengreen: A considerable literature in political science and foreign policy addresses this question. Famous examples would be President Truman and Korea on the one hand, and President Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis on the other. Earnest May, the Harvard political scientist, argued that Truman thought only in terms of Munich, Munich having been the searing political event of his generation. Given the perspective this created, Truman was predisposed to see the North Koreans and Chinese as crossing a red line and to react aggressively. Kennedy, on the other hand, was less preoccupied by Munich. He had historians like Arthur Schlesinger advising him. Those advisors encouraged him to develop and consider a portfolio of analogies and test their aptness – in other words, their “fitness” to the circumstances. One should look not only at Munich, Schlesinger and others suggested, but also to Sarajevo. It is important to look at a variety of other precedents for current circumstances, to think which conforms best to the current situation, and to take that fit into account when you’re using history to frame a response.
I think there was a tendency, when things were falling down around our ears in 2008, to refer instinctively to the Great Depression. What Munich was for Truman, the Great Depression is for monetary economists. It’s at least possible that the tendency to compare the two events and to frame the response to the current crisis in terms of the need “to avoid another Great Depression” was conducive to overreaction. In fairness, economic historians did point to other analogies. There was the 1907 financial crisis. There was the 1873 crisis. It would have been better, in any case, to have developed a fuller and more rounded portfolio of precedents and analogies and to have used it to inform the policy response. Of course, that would have required policy makers to have some training in economic history.
Sniderman: This probably brings us back full circle. We started with the uses and misuses of economic history and we’ve been talking about economic history throughout the conversation. I think it might be helpful to hear your perspective on what economic history and economic historians are. Why not just an economist who works in history or a historian who works on topics of economics? What does the term “economic history” mean, and what does the professional discipline of economic historian connote to you?
Eichengreen: As the name suggests, one is neither fish nor fowl; neither economist nor historian. This makes the economic historian a trespasser in other people’s disciplines, to invoke the phrase coined by the late Albert Hirschman. Historians reason by induction while economists are deductive. Economists reason from theory while historians reason from a mass of facts. Economic historians do both. Economists are in the business of simplifying; their strategic instrument is the simplifying assumption. The role of the economic historian is to say “Not so fast, there’s context here. Your model leaves out important aspects of the problem, not only economic but social, political, and institutional aspects – creating the danger of providing a misleading guide to policy.”
Economists reason from theory while historians reason from a mass of facts. Economic historians do both.
Sniderman: Do you think that, in training PhD economists, there’s a missed opportunity to stress the value and usefulness of economic history? Over the years, economics has become increasingly quantitative and math-focused. From the nature of the discussion we’ve had, it is clear that you don’t approach economic history as sort of a side interest of “Let’s study the history of things,” but rather a disciplined way of integrating economic theory into the context of historical episodes. Is that way of thinking about economic history appreciated as much as it could be?
Eichengreen: I should emphasize that the opportunity is not entirely missed. Some top PhD programs require an economic history course of their PhD students, the University of California, Berkeley, being one.
The best way of demonstrating the value of economic history to an economist, I would argue, is by doing economic history. So when we teach economic history to PhD students in economics in Berkeley, we don’t spend much time talking about the value of history. Instead, we teach articles and address problems, and leave it to the students, as it were, to figure how this style of work might be applied to this own research. For every self-identifying economic historian we produce, we have several PhD students with have a historical chapter, or a historical essay, or an historical aspect to their dissertations. That’s a measure of success.
Sniderman: Well, thank you very much. I’ve enjoyed it.
Eichengreen: Thank you. So have I.

27 maio 2013

Estereotipo na Europa

A tabela mostra o resultado da pesquisa realizada em cada país. É interessante que os alemães são considerados como mais verdadeiros, exceto pelos gregos. Outros países consideram que os gregos são menos verdadeiros. Franceses e alemães são os mais arrogantes, até pelos franceses.


Fonte: Via Marginal Revolution

01 março 2013

Remuneração de executivos

O Parlamento Europeu e a União Europeia concluíram nesta quinta-feira (28) um acordo que prevê colocar um teto aos bônus que os grandes bancos concedem a seus diretores, para evitar que se repita uma crise financeira como a de 2008.

O objetivo é colocar mais controle sobre os incentivos milionários que os diretores de bancos possuem.

Os salários milionários e os controversos bônus dos diretores de bancos estiveram no olho do furacão desde a explosão da crise financeira de 2009, após o colapso que provocou a queda de Bear Stearns e Lehman Brothers.

A medida - contemplada no acordo de regulação bancária Basileia III - deverá ser debatida na próxima terça-feira (5) durante a reunião de ministros das Finanças da União Europeia (UE).

07 novembro 2012

TCU da Comunidade Europeia

Vitor Caldeira, presidente do TCE [tribunal de contas da Comunidade Europeia] afirmou:

"Com as finanças públicas da Europa sob uma grande pressão, há ainda margem para gastar o dinheiro da UE de forma mais eficiente e de uma melhor forma orientada"

13 julho 2012

Trilema Europeu

Euro Zone Nations Wrestle With a 'Trilemma'
By STEPHEN CASTLE
The New York Times, July 6, 2012


LONDON — So, let’s say you have mastered the euro zone concept of “financial contagion.” Maybe you even know a thing or two about the euro “doom loop,” in which sickly banks and indebted governments threaten to drag each other down a death spiral.
Time now to learn a new buzzword, one that captures the anxieties of those seeking long-term stability for the euro currency union: “trilemma.”

The term, coined a dozen years ago by a Harvard University economist writing about the global economy, has come to encapsulate the awkward political options confronting the 17 euro zone countries. To make the currency union work for the long haul, euro countries’ heads of state have generally concluded that they must more fully integrate their economies. But within their own countries, the political leaders have only shallow support for that idea, if not outright resistance, from voters.

According to the trilemma theory, drawn in part from studies of the economic crises of 1930s and 1940s, it is possible to have two of three things: deep economic integration, democratic politics and autonomous nation-states. But under the theory, it is not possible to have all three.
“To remain in the euro zone under current conditions, countries like Greece, Italy and Spain are increasingly being forced to give up decision-making authority to rules imposed by Germany,” said Dani Rodrik, the father of the trilemma theory.

“This is creating democratic stresses at home,” he said. “Ultimately, externally imposed austerity becomes incompatible with democracy at home.” Mr. Rodrik, professor of international political economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, first wrote about the trilemma idea in 2000, well before the euro zone debt crisis began. But he said the euro problems presented a perfect illustration of his theory.

It is much more than an obscure academic debate. Almost everyone now accepts that much closer economic integration is needed to save the euro. But that raises the prospect of a reduced role for each nation-state within the currency bloc, and the creation of something closer to a federal structure for Europe, of the type that many of the original architects of the euro always expected to evolve.

...So how does Mr. Rodrik, the Harvard economist, propose that Europe resolve its trilemma?
A solution, in his view, might involve giving Greek, Spanish and Italian voters a greater say over euro zone decisions through a transnational system of democracy.
“This would be something like the U.S. federal system,” he wrote in an e-mail, “in which the federal government doesn’t bail out state governments but looks after residents of Florida, California, etc. directly because they are represented through their congressmen and senators.”
An alternative, Mr. Rodrik suggested, might be for those countries to leave the euro union, sacrificing greater economic and financial integration to regain sovereignty and democratic space.


“This is in essence the trilemma as it works out for the euro zone,” he wrote. “It says that economic union requires political union. The choice for Europe is either more political union, or less union — unless, that is, weaker countries are willing to give up on democracy.”
Another advocate of the theory, Nicholas Crafts, director of the Center for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy at the University of Warwick, points to a historical parallel.
Under the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement, which proposed a system of convertible currencies and set up bodies including the International Monetary Fund, the side of the trilemma triangle that was sacrificed was economic integration, he said. Instead of merging economies, countries were permitted to limit the flow of capital across borders, giving them the freedom to pursue the economic paths they thought best.


The euro zone, Mr. Crafts said, is putting an unbalanced emphasis on fiscal union through tough rules on debts and deficits meant to prevent a repetition of the crisis. “But we also need some compensating rules on the pooling of risks,” he said. “This would be a fiscal union that people want to belong to it; that has something to do with the federal level helping a state and not just disciplining it with a harsh straitjacket.” But Mr. Crafts said the political realities of the euro zone might make such a federal helping hand difficult to create. “If you can’t deliver the federalism as well as the economic straitjacket,” he said, “you might see the euro zone breaking up.”

15 junho 2012

Crise européia

Uma maneira criativa de representa a situação dos países europeus, conforme sua nota nas agências de ratings:

Os países com melhores notas estão no início da tabela "periódica" (Alemanha, Luxemburgo e Bélgica). Os piores (Grécia, Irlanda, Espanha e Chipre), no final

17 maio 2012

Futuro do Euro


Algumas considerações do professor de economia Miguel Leon Ledesma sobre a crise da dívida soberana na Europa:

Do you think the euro is a viable project? Will it survive?

The Euro is not viable in its current form and it will only survive if politicians design a credible strategy for its survival in the very short run. The fiscal compact as a survival strategy, with its reminiscence of the old stability pact rules, is almost ludicrous. It is not credible, and that is already a reality. If the stability pact was violated by the key players for years without any consequences and during less difficult times, does anyone believe that the pact is achievable or even beneficial to some member states during the deepest and longest recession for 70 years? Obviously not. The euro cannot survive unless there is a move towards more fiscal union pertaining debt and fiscal transfers. The union can be limited, there is no need for a grand transfer scheme and there are imaginative proposals out there about designing an efficient system for backing weaker states’ new sovereign debt issues. There is also a need for a true banking union with common regulatory rules. But the short run is much shorter than many like to believe. The state of denial cannot continue. Whether the euro can survive, thus, is a question that will be answered in the next few months.